As Trump pulls aid plug, can China step into the void in Africa?
By Sheriff Bojang Jnr
While US President Donald Trump’s foreign aid freeze and broader shift in foreign policy offers China an opportunity to enhance its soft power and extend influence in Africa, experts warn Beijing’s approach to aid means it won’t be able to fill the critical gaps that the US has been covering.
As countries, life-saving projects, and organisations across Africa reel from US President Donald Trump‘s executive order freezing foreign aid for 90 days, concerns have been raised about what his sweeping changes to the US policies as well as second term presidency mean for the continent.
Unlike previous US presidents, Trump does not inherently see Africa as a strategic priority, says global affairs analyst Curtis A. Smith, citing his transactional foreign policy and worldview shaped by deals, leverage, and personal legacy rather than traditional diplomatic frameworks.
“Trump is not a president who is moved by humanitarian concerns, multilateral cooperation, or long-term institutional commitments. He is a businessman at heart, and for him, every diplomatic engagement is a deal to be won,” Smith tells The Africa Report.
US exit an opportunity for China?
As Trump’s priorities lie elsewhere, some experts and opinion columnists say Africa should look up to China to swiftly assume the role American aid was playing and fill the gap left behind by shutting down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Trump’s foreign aid freeze – part of his America First Agenda – has created a strategic opening for China to broaden its influence in Africa, says Tenielle K. Ellis, a policy analyst and specialist in China-Africa relations, suggesting China can leverage this vacuum to enhance its soft power through financial partnerships, medical aid, and educational programs.
Between 2013 and 2023, Beijing invested over $700bn in Africa under its global infrastructure development strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, according to China’s commerce ministry. During the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit in September, President Xi Jinping pledged fresh funding of nearly $51bn to the continent over three years.
Last week, the China International Development Cooperation Agency and the Center for International Knowledge on Development, released a report on “small and beautiful” projects in China’s foreign aid, demonstrating “the humanistic care and kindness of China’s foreign aid and international development cooperation”.
As Africa’s largest trading partner, China will likely want to create and strengthen the narrative that when the US failed Africa by withdrawing its aid, it stepped in to support the continent, says Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, a lecturer at the political science department at Lagos State University in Nigeria.
Difference in aid policies
But while China is likely to increase its financial engagement in Africa, it will not fully swoop into the aid void left by the US, says Federico Manfredi Firmian, foreign policy expert and associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies.
He adds that China prefers loan-based funding and commercial investments rather than outright grants or humanitarian aid.
“This means that while Beijing may expand its footprint in infrastructure, technology, and trade, it is unlikely to fully replace USAID’s contributions to healthcare, emergency relief, and governance programs,” Firmian tells The Africa Report.
Countries that relied heavily on US humanitarian aid, he adds, will still face significant challenges, even if China steps in to provide some financial relief.
Oshodi says the fundamental aid policy difference between the US and China lies in the ‘Washington consensus’ or ‘post-Washington consensus’ that prioritise issues of governance on one hand, and the so-called ‘Beijing consensus’ that seemingly prioritises non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.
“China does not buy vaccines, distribute HIV drugs or pay for gender mainstreaming in schools in Africa because those are not part of its strategy,” says Bright Simons, the founder of mPedigree in Ghana. “China wants to be building roads and these kinds of things, because it has this hard development thesis that you need to build material capabilities and then the software will fit in.”
Furthermore, China, unlike the US, does not prioritise democratisation, civil society or human rights. Firmian says African nations will see reduced engagement in governance support and civil society-led initiatives, which could contribute to setbacks in civil and political liberties.
US aid to Africa in 2023 was $8bn compared to China’s total global foreign aid of $3bn. For Trevor Lwere, an economist at development consultancy Development Reimagined, it is unlikely China would triple its aid to cover the gap left by US funding cuts, “especially when you take into account the significant economic pressures at home that the Chinese government is dealing with”.
This, he argues, means the resources may not be readily available to fully plug the gap on a scale similar to what the US has been doing.
At the 9th Forum for China Africa Cooperation in Beijing last September, China and Africa drew up a plan for their engagement over the next three years. This plan, according to Lwere, is also likely to impose a limit on what China can do directly with and for African countries in the circumstances.
Filling the health and climate gap
Trump’s first set of executive orders – signed on his first day in office – also include pulling the US out of the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation, both of which are significant to Africa.
But China, according to policy analyst Ellis, views multilateral institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO) as key platforms for expanding its global leadership and strengthening economic partnerships with Africa. This gives China the opportunity to increase its contributions, reinforcing its role as a major global player within the continent and beyond.
“Given Africa’s significant reliance on the WHO and other multilateral organisations for critical development support, China’s increased financial backing would not only amplify its influence but also establish it as an indispensable partner in Africa’s growth, furthering its broader geopolitical objectives of expanding its global presence and soft power,” she says.
In 2016, when the US first pulled out of WHO, China increased its voluntary contributions by $30m, which, according to Lwere, was modest but carried significant symbolic value in terms of signalling to the global south, and African countries in particular, that they were still in the game.
With the US pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement, Lwere says China is presented with an opportunity to step up its climate financing for Africa where it is already doing important work with 90 clean energy projects agreed between China and Africa since 2021, according to Development Reimagined.
“Already being the leader in green technologies, China could increase its funding for climate financing and adaptation to support its African partners in dealing with the energy transition,” says Lwere.
