The April 1990 Orkar Coup: A Full Account
By Col. Lawal Gwadabe (Rtd)
It was exactly 35 years ago when the DG Government House Idris Adamu Kuta called me at about 11PM on 21st April, 1990. We were sitting at the Grains Board Guest House in Minna with all my security Chiefs, a practice I do every week to review the security situation of the State. My brother who came from Jos, Sanusi Mato, also joined me after we moved to the Government House. The truth of the matter was that, I didn’t even remember he was amongst us till the following morning because the heat of the battle at hand was so high.
Alhaji Labaran Kago also phoned and informed my DG Government House that they saw Tanks passing through on the Bridge at Suru-lere, heading to Lagos. Signifying that, there must be crisis and that definitely those Tanks were heading to the Dodan Barracks, the seat of Government.
I confirmed the DG’s information from some of my officers at the Ikeja Cantonment. I therefore decided that we all left for the Government House where we can set up a Command center to see how we can control the situation. Lt-Col Saviour Ogoina was the acting Bde Comd and he was with me because Col. M. B. Afred, the substantive Bde Comd was on annual leave.
The “Orkar Coup” should actually not be known with that name because Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was recruited at the tail end of planning the Coup to portray that people of the middle belt are as aggrieved as the people of the Niger-Delta, which was unfortunate. I had personally cautioned Major Orkar not to allow himself to be deceived and used by an agitation, which the Federal Government has put mechanism in place to mitigate those circumstances. I cautioned the Major when I called him to the Government House in Minna. I planned for him to go to Lagos and explain everything that he knew to President Babangida, thereby saving himself.
Organization of Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMAPADEC) was created to mitigate the complaints of environmental degradation and the oil producing states marginalization. But unfortunately, the good intentions of the Federal Government to address these anomalies of a land that produces our oil wealth are ultimately grounded by corruption perpetrated by the indigenes of the same South-South Region themselves, who were appointed to run the OMPADEC. Corruption has been the bane of the lack of genuine infrastructural development in the Niger Delta, then and it is manifestly so, today, 35 years later.
The April 22, 1990 attempted Coup was actually the brainchild of some junior officers from the Niger Delta Region. In fact, the whole idea was crafted by Lt. Col. P.W Forteta who was the kingpin and he sold the dummy to the young officers under Major Salina Mukoro, Capt. Charles Idele, Capt. Echendu, Dakoru, Sam Empere and many others and then chickened out.
The arrowheads of the 1990 Coup attempt were therefore Lt. Col P.W Forteta, Major Saliba Mukoro, Major Cyril Obaho, Major Gideon Orkar was only a conduit of convenience for the planners. Lt-Col G.A Nyiam was actually trapped by the sympathies he had for both the South-South officers and their rabid anti-Federal Government feelings of the so-called resource control and because of his experience, he became one of the leaders. The truth was that once he was trapped by them, there was no escaping for him.
When the captains drove out of Ikeja Cantonment at about 10:30pm, an officer called me from the Cantonment to alert me of the development. I was in the Grains Board Guest House with Col. S. Ogoina, the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Inusa Isa, Mr. Salu the ADS and the Airforce Comd, a habit we practice once a week to review the security of the state. On receipt of this information, I sensed that something was a miss, therefore we all relocated to the Government House where we have access to both signals and telephone communications. I immediately got a call from the duty officer of 242 Recee Bn, Ikeja, he confirmed that two officers have driven two armoured vehicles out of the Cantonment. I asked him is there any emergency in Lagos? He said negative. He could not get his CO that’s why he called me.
We started with 242 Recce Bn duty officer in Ikeja who updated us that the two Tanks have already headed for Lagos and that his Commanding Officer LT-Col G Zakari was nowhere to be found. That is why we organized that both Major Biu and Capt. Dada should organize a counter within the Cantonment and then head to Lagos to marry up with other loyal forces.
It was now very obvious that, those armoured Vehicles must be heading to the Dodan Barracks aimed at President Babangida and the Government. That was how I decided that we must keep calling our loyal officers and updating them on the situation. In all we put through almost 66 telephone calls across the country that very night.
I called Major Biu of 123 Gds Bn and Capt. Dada, several times, to rally round some loyal officers. I put a call to my friend Lt-Col Gandu Zidon the CO of 2 Gds Bn to update him and asked them to please liaise with General Abubakar Dada our Director of Armour. I also laid hands on some officers at the 242 Recce Bn and our Corps Headquarter Company (CHC) who drove some of the new sagaie armoured vehicles that were in CHC from Ikeja to the Niger State Liaison Office. It was all these combined forces under the command of Lt-Col Gandu Zidon that accomplished the mission that also ended the attempted coup. Brigadier Abubakar Dada truly rose the occasion.
My ADC Capt. AS Umar joined us at that stage and I handed him my telephone diary that contained virtually the names of who is who in the Armed Forces of Nigeria. That was how we started the “Telephone Battle” to save President Babangida and his Regime. We first of all put a call to the Commanding Officer of 242 Reccee Bn the officer in-charge of these young officers. The CO was not available. We put a call to Comd 9 Bde, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiya his wife told us he was not at home. Then, I decided that we should just rally our young loyal officers in both 123 Inf Bn, the Corps HQ Company and some elements 242 Recee Bn.
Under these officers, we directed that they should use the new Sagaie Armoured fighting vehicles that were in Corps Headquarter Company (CHC) to March to Lagos and to report to our Director of Armour Brigadier Abubakar Dada, who was positioned at Niger State Liaison Office in Victoria Island. He, however relocated to his Bonny Camp HQ after the completion of the operations early in the morning on the 22nd April, 1990.
At the same time, I called Lt-Col. U.K Bello to alert him on the developments at the Ikeja Cantonment and told him to await further information from what we are receiving from the plethora of telephone calls my ADC was putting through to all our military formations. I put five calls to President Babangida, he refused to pick the calls. On the sixth time I directed Major Sidi who was manning the control to go breakdown the door of where the President was sitting because those Tanks Advancing to the Dodan Barracks would spare no body. I told Major Sidi that if any harm is done to the President, he should consider himself a dead man. Meanwhile unknown to the President we have through the telephone arranged the evacuation of his family by Mr. Saichawa, the SSS Officer attached to her section. The Madam and her daughter were relocated to the house of one of the royal captains not far away from the Dodan Barracks. This was a deception because the coupists will never detect that she was at that Towers, nearby.
So many things were playing out that night. I put call to our Director of Armour Brigadier Abubakar Dada who was on the third Mainland Bridge returning home. I briefed him on the situation on the ground and pleaded that he heads back to the Niger State Liaison Office on Victoria Island to set up Command Center where we will be directing all loyal officers to report to him. He was the most Senior Officer on the ground as it were that night. Most Senior Officers we contacted that night were either not available or no reply from their phones. Gen Dada took the challenge and our Liaison Officer Mr. Tiny Tanko provided the assembled officers and men all the necessary logistics. Brig Dada now became the Central Command that coordinated all elements including the 2GDs Bn under Lt-Col Gandu Zidon that eventually launched the counter-attack that flushed the rebels from the NBC. That was how Lt-Col Gandu Zidon announced the end of the rebellion. There was also a separate encounter at the Bonny Camp, where some of the rebels were killed and Major Orkar was arrested.
Major Sidi decided my threat was serious, along with the Soldiers, they forcibly persuaded the President to leave and they whisked him away to a pre-destinated safe house thereby saving his life. It was not long after the President was whisked away by the SSS Officer Mr. Saulawa and his team, that landed exactly where the President was sitting watching television, collapsing the entire building.
Lt-Col UK Bello decided not to wait for further information from me, and took an Armoured car along with WO2 Yusuf and headed towards the NBC to confront Major Mukuro and the rebels. Unfortunately, the Armoured car that they carried was immobilized by the removal of the firing pin by a conspirator duty officer Lt. Echendu. Meaning both Lt-Col Bello and WO2 Yusuf were dead ducks. On seeing Lt-Col Nyiam who was Col Bello’s course mate, Col Bello marched towards them saying we are all the same “let us discuss our differences” but instead of acknowledging these entreaties, Major Mukoro took the laws into his hand and along with Lt Okekumatalor shot Lt-Col UK Bello at close range and he died instantly. WO2 Yusuf seeing what happened alighted from the Tank and he was also shot in the leg, which was broken. But he managed to run into the Cemetery and ended up landing inside the Police Barracks with his shattered leg, thereby saving his own life through the charge of his pumped up Adrenalin. He was taken to the hospital in the morning by the members of the Nigeria Police Force.
We kept communicating with Brigadier Dada and many other officers in Lagos, until we got a favourable outcome. I also kept in touch with Gen. Abacha, who was whisked to back to the flagstaff house by his son Ibrahim Abacha from the Guest House at the Alexander Avenue. The coupists went to the Guest House, but they didn’t see Gen Abacha. I briefed him on all that we did all night. I also briefed him that I have directed the Acting Bde Comd to broadcast support for the Government and I will phone all the other military Governors and Bde Commanders to do the same. That was early in the morning of the 22/4/1990. He directed that I should do so immediately. I contacted Col. Dantsoho and passed Gen Abacha’s directive. When Gen Diya was contacted, he was hesitating, I called Col. Danladi Zakari the Col GS of 3 Armed Division, and the Plateau State Governor Col. AAU Kama and they swiftly took action. When I called Col. Idris Garba, the Military Governor of Kano State the 3Bde Comd Col. MC Alli happened to be in his office and I reported the Chief of Army Staff have directed the Coup be resisted. Col. MC Alli then dictated to Col Dantsoho at HQ I Div what was to be broadcasted. I was actually on the phone with Dantsoho constantly, 1 Division was therefore accomplished. That was how through the telephone and many signals being sent by my ADC to all the formation in the country and all the Military Governors that, we were able to stabilize the situation. My ADC was also in constant touch with Samaila Gwarzo, the DG SSS to brief him. I also called the GOC 82 Division and passed the directives. But it was Col Attah, the Military Governor of Cross River State (CRS) and the Commander 13Bde that rose to the occasion.
Late Gen. Hassan Usman Katsina
That night for some miraculous circumstances, all the telephones in Nigeria were working perfectly. Every call we put through went through even though some rang out without reply. In continuation of our “telephone battle” after speaking severally to Major John Temlong. I was happy that he took charge of Kaduna from that night and in the morning 241 Reccee Bn was dominating the ground.
We tried the Kaduna Assistant Director of SSS, he was not available. I therefore put a call to one of our trusted officers there, in the person of Mohammed Ali. I briefed him on the developing situation in Lagos, and what we were able to achieve through telephone contacts from Minna. Then, I urged him to do whatever is necessary to strengthen the resolve of Col. Dantsoho Mohammed who was the Colonel GS of 1 Division, Kaduna. It also happened that Mohammed Ali was the duty officer of the SSS that night.
Very early in the morning, Mohammed Ali contacted and updated many serving and retired officers. He also remarkably drove to the house of Colonel Dantsoho Mohammed at Kinshasa Road, Kaduna and picked him to Late General Hassan Usman Katsina’s house. They briefed the General about the situation and Gen. Hassan asked them to give him few minutes to dress up and together, they drove to the house of the FRCN Manager’s house on Dawaki Road, and picked him to the FRCN Studio where General Hassan recorded his broadcast, which was aired continuously nation-wide by the FRCN Kaduna, through out that day.
Gen. Hassan denounced the coup and the primitive excise of some Northern States from the Federation. He equally expressed unflinching support for the Babangida regime and also predicted that, the attempt will fail. General Hassan’s broadcast went along way to calm the situation in the North and it prevented any resort to retaliation and the breakdown of law and order. This action became necessary because the GOC of 1 Mechanized Division was not in station, he was on his annual leave. General Hassan was a great patron of the North and a patriotic Nigerian hence our resort to him as a rallying point.
Having coordinated all the broadcasts across the country, I called Gen Sani Abacha again to report our accomplishments. By then Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the President has been brought to the flagstaff house from the safe house and I spoke to him and his wife. I also poured out our frustrations, on why they our seniors usually ignored our signals of impending troubles, until it happened. That morning was not the best time to speak on these issues, but I strongly reminded the President that I sent Major Gideon Orkar to see him in Dodan Barracks three weeks before the incident. I got permission from the Comdt of the Staff College where Orkar was a staff to come to Minna, from where I sent him to Lagos to brief the Commander-in-Chief. He waited all-day at Lt-Col- UK Bello’s office until evening. When the President finished his meeting, he told Major Orkar that he was too tired, Orkar should come back tomorrow. We went to great length to ensure that Major Orkar made that trip to Lagos. My ADC Capt. Umar re-fitted his car with new tyres, my DG Government House provided him enough funds for the trip.
Since Major Orkar left the Dodan Barracks, the coupists altered the date of their attempted coup and brought the date forward because they were now aware that the Authorities were monitoring them and the end was near. We actually infiltrated two junior officers to be monitoring them and I was briefing the C-in-C my weekly diaries reports to him. That was how I determined that it was time for the C-in-C to have an audience with Major Orkar. I was sure they adjusted their original date, and took the nation by surprise by their daring plan which was conceived to be bloody, but our quick reaction and coupled with the failure of their own communications resulted in the failure. Lt-Col Nyiam, Major Mukoro and the officers at the NBC sensed a mortal danger after the death of Lt-Col. UK Bello and escaped, leaving their rag-tag troops to face the wrath of the Federal Forces. The senior officers had their escape plans that was not known to the bulk of their followers which consisted of junior officers and an army of serving and retired soldiers. Those elements were the ones that were trapped and arrested and they faced the music for their failure.
The other drama that was now taking place is at the Dodan Barracks. I called the President several times he did not pick my calls. I called Major Sidi who was in charge of control and re-emphasized to him that, there are Tanks approaching Dodan Barrack and I must speak to the President, otherwise Major Sidi should arrange to evacuate the President and his family as per the laid down procedure. All efforts for me to speak to Lt-Col UK Bello proved abortive because after my first briefing to him, he decided to go out and organize a counter-attack. Major Sidi also told me he relayed my message to all of them. Eventually, reason prevailed and the President was evacuated to safety.
One of the things I did immediately, the Major Orkar broadcast started getting aired, I directed my ADC Capt. A.S. Umar, to send a signal requesting all communications to the General Headquarters Lagos (GHQ) by Military Governors and all our military formations should be routed through Minna. My ADC kept them all updated on the situation from our Government House signals center.
When we finished all our telephone calls and all coordinations between Lagos, Kaduna, Jos, Bauchi and the Military Governors, and most of the military formations, again called General Abacha at the flagstaff house to brief him on what has transpired throughout the night and in the morning. He was very delighted and announced that I should hold the line for the President. I spoke to the President at length as I indicated in the foregoing. Finally, I also told the President that I re-routed all signals traffic to Minna, but now that I have spoken to him, my ADC will send a signal to all our address groups to revert back control to Lagos GHQ for all communications and directives. The ADC complied promptly.
When Colonel Dantsoho was becoming a bit confused at the initial stages of this saga, I called the gallant Major John Temlong the CO of 241 Recee Battalion and was updating him on all situations. Major Temlong was actually ready to march with entire 241 Recee Battalion to marry with us in Minna and head to Lagos if the situation was not brought under control. I assured Major Temlong that we will use any available state resources to support every move of the 241 Recee Battalion to Lagos. That was the spirit of gallantry, and dedication to the cause of our country. It is the epitome of the Combat Arm of Decision.
In Bauchi on the other hand, we were in communication with our brilliant and ebullient Col. Dangiwa Umar as the Commandant of our Armour School in Bauchi, Col. Umar was prepared to immediately commandeer Civilian Load Loaders and Fuel Tankers to load our Armoured Fighting Vehicles to march on Lagos. That move was only stopped when the coup was suppressed. There were so many heroic actions by our gallant officers and soldiers, which can’t be adequately captured here. But their actions for duty and country are highly appreciated.
When we called the CO of 19 Battalion, his phone was not going through. We could also not establish contact with some of our Military Police Officers in Ojo Cantonment. Apparently, what happened was that, the Cantonment was captured by the coupists under Capt. Sam Empere, who detained the CO of 19Bn and many officers. They were released when the coup failed later.
Tribute to Lt-Col. UK BELLO
The essence of this reminiscing about an incident that took place 35 years ago is to highlight to our coming generations the heroism and the dedication to duty of our officers and soldiers to the cause of our country Nigeria, which often times led to the supreme sacrifice.
It is therefore pertinent to remember and salute the courage and sacrifice of all the dramatis personae that contributed to the suppression of the so-called Gideon Orkar attempted coup of April 22, 1990. We therefore pay our great tribute and extend our heartfelt gratitude to LT-Col UK Bello a very bright, loyal and gallant officer who sacrificed his life to depend the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria as his ADC. May the Almighty Allah grant him eternal rest in Jannah.
We equally salute and extend our heartfelt gratitude to all the officers and soldiers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria who served relentlessly the Nation with their utmost sincerity and devotion. We thank all of them collectively for standing strong during the toughest hours of their lives to depend and protect the integrity of our dear Nation.
For those whom have passed on since the past thirty-five years, we pray that may the Almighty God have mercy on their souls. Sometimes when we reflect, this is an ungrateful Nation to the plight of the members of its Armed Forces Post Service. May the almighty God create a spirit of change for the better. To our members of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, please continue to cheer up, the solidarity of Nigerians is always with you, and despite all the current conditions, remains resolute to your oath. Nigeria is the only country that we have, therefore continue to
Gwadabe is a retired military officer and former military governor of Niger State
